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A PROPOSAL FOR A COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL 
SECURITY AT THE WTO 
SIMON LESTER & INU MANAK* 
World Trade Organization (WTO) committees meet regularly to 
monitor and oversee the implementation of the WTO agreements. It rarely 
makes the news, but this work is nonetheless an important supportive 
function of the organization. The committees cover a wide range of topics, 
and some have been added from time to time. In this Article, we propose a 
Committee on National Security to address the growing challenge to the 
trade regime presented by national security measures. WTO litigation has a 
limited ability to handle these sensitive issues, and there would be great 
value in a committee designated to provide oversight of these measures. This 
would include the following components: a forum for regular discussion and 
coordination of approaches on trade-related aspects of national security 
matters; a monitoring mechanism to increase transparency on the use and 
application of national security measures; a Technical Group for developing 
recommendations and guidelines; and a process for immediate rebalancing, 
either through compensation or retaliation, where such measures have been 
imposed and their impact on trade can be demonstrated. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
World Trade Organization (WTO) litigation is often high-profile and 
receives many of the headlines relating to the organization’s work. Legal 
rulings that one country may impose billions of dollars in trade sanctions on 
another, or that an environmental law has been found to violate international 
trade obligations, grab people’s attention. But there is lesser-known 
administrative work of the WTO, where various committees1 meet regularly 
to monitor and oversee the implementation of the WTO agreements.  It rarely 
makes the news, but this work is nonetheless an important supportive 
function of the organization. 
Like other parts of the WTO, the committees are member-driven and 
are composed of country delegates from either the missions in Geneva or 
from the capitals. While they do not make decisions that have binding legal 
effect, they can serve a variety of functions, such as sharing best practices, 
developing guidelines for technical cooperation activities, or providing a 
forum for Members to discuss trade actions another Member has taken. This 
last function covers a range of different measures: tariffs, rules of origin, 
anti-dumping measures, environmental protection measures, and other 
domestic regulations, such as anti-obesity food labeling rules, to name a few. 
It is important to note that not all matters discussed in committees are 
covered directly by WTO obligations. 
The committees cover a wide range of topics, but these generally fit into 
two broad categories: those that focus on specific obligations in the WTO 
agreements, such as the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, the 
Committee on Agriculture, and the Committee on Safeguards; and those that 
focus on broader systemic issues, such as the Committee on Trade and 
Environment, Committee on Trade and Development, and the Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements. 
But there is no reason for the current list to be set in stone. Committees 
have been added from time to time, such as the Working Group on Trade, 
Debt, and Finance and the Working Group on Trade and Transfer of 
Technology, which were established pursuant to the Doha Mandate, and 
more recently, the Committee on Trade Facilitation.2 If additional areas 
would benefit from oversight, new committees should be formed. The 
 
 1.  The term “committee” is used here to describe the work of councils, specific committees and 
working groups. 
 2.  See Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance, WTO, https://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_wkgp _trade_debt_finance_e.htm; Working Group on Trade and Transfer 
of Technology, WTO (June 16, 2014), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ devel_e/dev_wkgp_ 
trade_transfer_technology_e.htm; Trade facilitation, WTO (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/tradfa_e.htm - V. 
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political decision-making bodies of the WTO, the Ministerial Council and 
the General Council, have the authority to establish new committees, and set 
their terms of reference, that is, the scope of what the committee covers. In 
this Article, we propose a Committee on National Security to address the 
growing challenges to the trade regime3 presented by national security 
measures. WTO litigation has a limited ability to handle these sensitive 
issues,4 and there would be great value in a committee designated to provide 
oversight of these measures. As described in more detail below, this would 
include the following components: a forum for regular discussion and 
coordination of approaches on trade-related aspects of national security 
matters; a monitoring mechanism to increase transparency on the use and 
application of national security measures; a Technical Group for developing 
recommendations and guidelines; and a process for immediate rebalancing, 
either through compensation or retaliation, where such measures have been 
imposed and their impact on trade can be demonstrated. 
II. THE FUNCTIONS OF WTO COMMITTEES 
The WTO is made up of a number of standing and ad hoc bodies with 
various roles.5 The Ministerial Conference, which serves as the highest 
executive body and is composed of minister-level representatives from each 
country, meets at least every two years. The Ministerial Conference can 
make binding decisions on all WTO matters. The General Council, which 
meets regularly throughout the year, has the same authority as the Ministerial 
Conference when the latter is not in session, and is made up of ambassador-
level diplomats. Representatives to the General Council also sit on the 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which meets every month, and the Trade 
Policy Review Body (TPRB). 
 
 3.  See generally J. Benton Heath, The New National Security Challenge to the Economic Order, 
129 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2020) (discussing the impact of national security policies on trade law and 
investment flows). 
 4.  The value of WTO litigation on these issues is uncertain at this point. National security 
litigation could harm the WTO as an institution if Members do not comply with rulings, as it would 
undermine confidence in the system more broadly. On the other hand, there may be instances where a 
government wants a national security restriction adjudicated simply for the moral force a ruling provides. 
A full evaluation of the impact of this litigation will have to await the outcomes of several ongoing cases. 
See generally Simon Lester & Huan Zhu, A Proposal for ‘Rebalancing’ to Deal with ‘National Security’ 
Trade Restrictions, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1451 (2019) [hereinafter, Lester & Zhu, Proposal for 
Rebalancing] (discussing the recent increase in litigation involving WTO concerns); Simon Lester & 
Huan Zhu, Closing Pandora’s Box: The Growing Abuse of the National Security Rationale for Restricting 
Trade, CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS (June 25, 2019) [hereinafter Lester & Zhu, Closing Pandora’s Box] 
(discussing the Trump Administration’s expansion of the WTO’s national security rationale clause). 
 5.  WTO Organizational Chart, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/ 
organigram_e.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2020). 
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Below the General Council are numerous administrative bodies, 
including specialized councils, committees, working groups, and working 
parties that support the work of both the General Council and the Ministerial 
Conference. Notably, these bodies operate with high degrees of 
independence, as their work tends to be highly technical.6 The committees 
and working groups operate below the political or executive arm of the 
WTO, with some reporting to the Council for Trade in Goods and the 
Council for Trade in Services. 
The WTO’s committees are responsible for what is known as the 
“regular work” of the organization—they oversee the day-to-day 
implementation of the agreements, as well as discuss a number of systemic 
issues. Some of this work is focused on developing specific or general 
guidelines, recommendations, decisions, and principles that can help 
facilitate the implementation of the agreements. It is important to note that 
this function does not change the text of the agreements, but rather serves as 
the “building blocks” to establish best practices.7 For instance, principles 
developed in the TBT Committee have shaped a number of obligations in 
regional trade agreements.8 Furthermore, these knowledge exchanges are 
vital in preventing trade friction from arising between Members in the first 
place through increasing transparency, for example, by establishing clear 
guidelines on when a Member should notify a potentially trade impacting 
measure, and what that notification should include. 
Another important aspect of some committees is the “specific work,” 
which provides an opportunity for members to raise what can be referred to 
as “specific trade concerns” on measures that other Members have taken or 
may be planning to take that could cause trade friction.9 These concerns are 
sometimes based on official notifications from Members, actions that may 
warrant a notification, or counternotifications from other Members. Specific 
trade concerns are raised by one or more Member (the Members concerned) 
to another Member (the Member maintaining the measure). 
A number of scholars and experts have noted that the specific function 
has been especially beneficial in providing a forum to resolve disagreements 
 
 6.  PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE & WERNER ZDOUC, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION 135 (4th ed. 2017). 
 7.  ERIK N. WIJKSTRÖM, INT’L CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV. [ICTSD], THE THIRD 
PILLAR: BEHIND THE SCENES, WTO COMMITTEE WORK DELIVERS 3 (Aug. 2015). 
 8.  Devin McDaniels et al., A Closer Look at WTO’s Third Pillar: How WTO Committees Influence 
Regional Trade Agreements, 21 J. INT’L ECON. L. 815, 830 (2018). 
 9.  WIJKSTRÖM, supra note 7, at 4. Not all committees refer to these as specific trade concerns, but 
they exist in many committees under different categories of issues discussed, and can be raised, for 
example, as separate agenda items, and in more limited cases as “Other Business.” 
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before they can become disputes.10 However, others have pointed out that 
the outcome of resolutions is often limited, with regulatory adjustments only 
at the margins.11 What many agree on is that the committees provide an 
essential forum for Members to openly discuss concerns, particularly giving 
voice to smaller country Members that do not always have the resources to 
travel between capitals to find clarification or resolution on an issue. In 
addition, the committees also provide Members the opportunity to identify 
other Members that are similarly impacted by a measure and to coordinate a 
response.12 
While the committees vary greatly in all of these functions, with the 
technical barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
committees often identified as models of success, all provide similar basic 
functions that are vital to the organization’s daily operation. Thus, there is 
room to learn from how different committees that address a wide range of 
issues, sometimes cross-cutting, are able to manage a balance between the 
right of Members to take certain actions and the overall maintenance of an 
open multilateral trading system. In the next sections, we examine recent 
concerns over the role of national security in the trading system and explore 
how a specialized committee might be of value in this area. 
III. THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL SECURITY LITIGATION 
After decades of careful avoidance of WTO disputes over national 
security measures, there has been a proliferation of such disputes in recent 
years.13 But can the WTO litigation process resolve these disputes? 
 
 10.  See Kateryna Holzer, Addressing Tensions and Avoiding Disputes: Specific Trade Concerns in 
the TBT Committee 2–3 (WTO, Econ. Research & Statistics Div. Staff, Working Paper ERSD-2018-11, 
2018), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201811_e.pdf; Henrik Horn et al., In the Shadow 
of the DSU: Addressing Specific Trade Concerns in the WTO SPS and TBT Committees 1 (Columbia 
Univ. Law Sch., The Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 494, 2013) (discussing how STCs can 
serve as informal mechanisms for resolution of trade conflict); WIJKSTRÖM, supra note 7, at 4–5 
(discussing the effectiveness of STCs). See generally Robert Wolfe, Letting the Sun Shine in at the WTO: 
How Transparency Brings the Trading System to Life (WTO, Staff Working Paper, No. ERSD-2013-03, 
2013) (discussing the merits of the WTO’s dispute settlement system). 
 11.  Tim Dorlach & Paul Mertenskötter, Interpreters of International Economic Law: Corporations 
and Bureaucrats in Contest Over Chile’s Food Warning Label, (forthcoming); Inveer Manak, Enforcing 
International Trade Law in the World Trade Organization’s Committees: Courting Third Party Opinion 
147 (Nov. 24, 2019) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University) (on file with Georgetown 
University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences). 
 12.  See Manak, supra note 11 (“The committees are not a cold call, and not an exercise in general 
learning about a measure—they are primarily targeted at learning about the responses of the broader 
membership.”). 
 13.  Recent cases with a national security element are as follows: Eight complaints in United 
States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products filed in 2018 (DS544, 547, 548, 550, 551, 
552, 554, 556); five complaints  involving Qatar as a complainant or a respondent, two filed in 2019 
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The first WTO panel report interpreting the GATT Article XXI national 
security exception was issued in 2019 in the Russia—Traffic in Transit 
case.14 In the coming months and years, there will likely be several additional 
rulings in ongoing cases, including the highly contentious litigation over the 
Section 232 steel/aluminum tariffs imposed by the United States under the 
Trump administration. But the prospects of such rulings providing a 
resolution to those cases are limited.15 To some extent, a Member’s 
declaration that a measure is for national security purposes could be taken as 
a statement that it will not change the measure even in the face of a WTO 
DSB ruling against it. As a result, there may be limits to the effectiveness of 
litigation in this area. 
Of course, DSB rulings and subsequent compliance through 
modification or withdrawal of the measure are not the only ways to resolve 
trade conflict. Article 3 of the DSU refers to “mutually agreed solutions,” 
and a variety of such agreements have been reached over the years. As long 
as it does not violate a specific WTO obligation, any such solution is 
permitted. One solution that is always available is to rebalance the 
obligations as between the parties involved in the conflict, in the form of 
compensation and suspension of concessions or other obligations as 
temporary measures. 
In the context of disputes, rebalancing takes place pursuant to the 
provisions of DSU Article 22. But there are other possibilities for 
rebalancing, such as the special procedures of Article 8 of the Safeguards 
Agreement, which allow for compensation and retaliation without going 
through a dispute settlement process.16 Making rebalancing available in these 
circumstances is a political and policy decision. Traditionally, immediate 
rebalancing has only been available for safeguards, but the case could be 
made for rebalancing in other contexts too. 
There is a strong case for immediate rebalancing in the context of 
national security.17 Where national security is mentioned, formally or 
informally, as a justification for a measure, a violation is often assumed and 
not even contested, although where litigation eventually arises, a responding 
 
(DS567, 576), one filed in 2018 (DS526), two filed in 2017 (DS527, 528); four disputes between Russian 
and Ukraine, one filed in 2020 (DS499), one filed in 2019 (DS512), two filed in 2017 (DS525, 532); and 
a complaint, filed in 2019, by South Korea against Japan (DS590). 
 14.  Panel Report, Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, WTO Doc. WT/DS512/R 
(adopted Apr. 5, 2019). 
 15.  Lester & Zhu, Proposal for Rebalancing, supra note 4, at 1451−52; Lester & Zhu, Closing 
Pandora’s Box, supra note 4, at 1. 
 16.  Lester & Zhu, Proposal for Rebalancing, supra note 4, at 1468; Lester & Zhu, Closing 
Pandora’s Box, supra note 4, at 7. 
 17.  Lester & Zhu, Closing Pandora’s Box, supra note 4, at 1. 
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party may put forward arguments contesting that assumption. If the national 
security justification is upheld in the context of litigation, there is little hope 
of inducing compliance with WTO obligations. As noted, a government’s 
declaration of national security as the reason for a measure is essentially a 
statement that it will not comply with a ruling against it. Thus, moving on to 
the rebalancing stage immediately where national security has been formally 
cited as the justification for the measure is appropriate. 
For rebalancing to work, however, there needs to be a set of rules that 
define the scope of measures covered18 and a body to oversee them. A 
Committee on National Security can be helpful here, and can also serve 
additional functions related to conflict over trade restrictions related to 
national security. 
IV. THE ROLE OF A COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY 
In response to the Trump administration’s Section 232 steel/aluminum 
tariffs, which were imposed in 2018, many countries latched on to the 
Safeguards Agreement rebalancing process as a way to retaliate. That 
approach was of questionable legality,19 given that the United States had not 
purported to be taking safeguard measures, but as a matter of principle it was 
understandable. What is missing is a legal and orderly process for achieving 
a similar outcome, with an option of compensation rather than retaliation as 
the means of rebalancing. A Committee on National Security could take on 
this role and guide the issue of national security trade restrictions more 
generally.  
The General Council can establish a Committee on National Security 
(NS) and set out its terms of reference. Given the cross-cutting nature of 
national security issues (affecting goods, services, intellectual property, and 
various systemic issues), the NS Committee should report directly to the 
General Council. The precise scope of the committee would have to be 
 
 18.  If all measures justified by national security were subject to rebalancing, the system would be 
overwhelmed, so it is only a subset of national security measures that are covered. One approach would 
be to apply this process to new measures that upset the existing negotiated balance, but other possibilities 
could also be explored. 
 19.  The United States challenged the retaliatory actions of six Members. See Request for 
Consultations, Canada—Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS557/1 (Sept. 11, 2019); Request for Consultations, China—Additional Duties on Certain Products 
from the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS558/1 (Sept. 11, 2019); Request for Consultations, European 
Union—Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS559/1 (Sept. 
11, 2019); Request for Consultations by the United States, Mexico—Additional Duties on Certain 
Products from the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS560/1 (Jul. 19, 2018); Request for Consultations, 
Turkey—Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS561/1 (Sept. 
11, 2019); Request for Consultations, Russian Federation—Additional Duties on Certain Products from 
the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS566/1 (Sept. 11, 2019). 
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defined through discussions at the level of the Ministerial Conference or the 
General Council. In general terms, it should serve as a focal point for the 
discussion and coordination of approaches to national security matters and 
trade in the WTO, as well as be open to the participation of any Member. 
Bringing these discussions to a permanent committee at an early stage, with 
a clear process for addressing them, could be useful in reducing the 
sometimes adversarial nature of exchange on these issues in the General 
Council when they occasionally burst onto the agenda.20 
In developing the scope of the NS committee’s work, the following 
should be considered for the terms of reference: 
• To have he Committee elect its own Chair and meet as necessary, but 
no less than once a year, for the purpose of affording Members the 
opportunity of consulting on any matters relating to trade and 
national security. 
• To keep measures taken for national security reasons that have an 
impact on trade under continuous review. This can include, but is 
not limited to, notifications, counternotifications, and annual 
reviews of the committee’s work, reported to the General Council. 
Formal invocation of GATT Article XXI, GATS Article XIV, or 
TRIPS Agreement Article 73 is not required for a measure to be 
considered. 
• To provide guidelines and recommendations for, and to review 
periodically, technical cooperation activities as they relate to 
national security measures. This can include, for example, guidance 
on notification requirements and how sensitive information should 
be handled. 
• To establish an open-ended Technical Group and working parties or 
other bodies as may be appropriate, including ad hoc consultation 
bodies, to allow for off-the-record discussions on specific matters 
between interested parties. 
• To provide guidance on the rebalancing process, including, for 
example, general principles and guidelines for ad hoc consultations. 
 
 20.  For example, China put the United States’ Section 232 Investigations and Measures on Steel 
and Aluminum Products on the General Council agenda on May 8, 2018. See WTO General Council, 
Minutes of the Meeting, ¶ 4.1, WTO Doc. WT/GC/M/172 (July 6, 2018). China elicited the following 
response from U.S. Ambassador to the WTO, Dennis Shea: “the United States finds it curious that China 
has asked to place this item on the agenda for today’s meeting . . . we are perplexed that China now asserts 
its status as a victim . . . [w]e note the attempt by some Members to cast the President’s actions in terms 
that suit their desire to pursue a particular WTO recourse. These attempts are without valid foundation 
and we will not entertain them.” U.S. Mission Geneva, Ambassador Dennis Shea’s Statement at the WTO 
General Council, U.S. MISSION TO INT’L ORG. IN GENEVA (May 8, 2018), https://geneva.usmission.gov/ 
2018/05/08/ambassador-dennis-sheas-statement-at-the-wto-general-council/. 
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• To assist the committee in its monitoring function, the Secretariat 
shall prepare annually a factual report on the trade impact of national 
security measures based on notifications and other reliable 
information available to it. 
This basic framework is by no means comprehensive, but it touches 
upon the key functions that the NS Committee should provide to be most 
useful to Members. A few specific aspects of these functions will now be 
discussed in greater detail. 
A. Notifications & Specific Trade Concerns 
In order to assist the committee with its monitoring function, Members 
should notify all national security restrictions having an impact on trade to 
the Secretariat. The notification should include: the title of the measure and 
its text; the government body responsible for developing the measure; a list 
of products or services impacted by the measure; the objective and rationale 
that led the Member to “consider” it necessary, including the nature of urgent 
problems where applicable; references to particular sub-provisions of the 
relevant national security provisions; and a contact point. 
As things stand now, governments have the ability to impose trade 
restrictions for protectionist purposes and later invoke the national security 
exceptions during litigation. There are requirements that Members “should 
be informed to the fullest extent possible of trade measures taken under” 
GATT Article XXI and GATS Article XIV,21 but the notification obligation 
needs to be stronger. It would be desirable to have all national security trade 
restrictions announced at the earliest possible stage, ideally during the 
process of internal domestic deliberation, in order to have a proper debate 
and discussion. Measures that have actually been imposed should be reported 
immediately. Bringing these cases to light early and having WTO Members 
think carefully about the proper scope of the exception is of great value. 
Notifications should be made available to all Members and catalogued 
online as part of a national security measures information management 
system, similar to the TBT and SPS information management systems.22 This 
will allow Members to search all notifications, the concerns raised in 
committee, the relevant enquiry points for other Members, and to make 
 
 21.  Decision of 30 November 1982, Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement, ¶ 
1, L/5426 (1982); GATT Analytical Index (pre-1995), WTO, Article XXI Security Exceptions, in GATT 
ANALYTICAL INDEX (PRE-1995) 606 (1994); WTO, GATS Article XIV bis Security Exceptions (Practice), 
in WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX ¶ 2 (Feb. 2019). 
 22.  See generally WTO, Technical Barriers to Trade Information Management System (Jun. 24, 
2019), http://tbtims.wto.org/en/ (explaining how the TBS IMS works); WTO, Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Information Management System (Jun. 12, 2019), http://spsims.wto.org/en/ (explaining how the SPS IMS 
works). 
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available all reports related to the committee’s work. Of course, as certain 
aspects of national security measures must, by their very nature, be kept 
confidential, guidelines should be developed as to the appropriate detail 
provided on these measures to the public. However, this aspect of the 
committee should be kept as transparent as possible, along with minutes of 
the committee meetings, to allow for maximum participation of all Members, 
since not all Members are able to attend every meeting due to the small size 
of their delegations. This will give Members the opportunity to raise specific 
trade concerns (STCs) based on notifications provided, as well as a system 
for submitting their own counternotifications. STCs should also be recorded 
in an online database. 
Transparency provisions in the TBT and SPS agreements have helped 
to facilitate non-judicial settlements through establishing best practices and 
also through STCs.23 STCs enhance transparency by allowing Members to 
name and shame their peers, so that Members are held accountable for the 
measures they take. In committee, a Member that is maintaining a measure 
must provide a response to the Member or Members concerned, ensuring 
that some dialogue takes place, whether it be in clarifying the rationale for a 
measure, or explaining why a measure has not been notified, for instance. It 
thus provides a forum for Members to communicate when bilateral 
discussions fail. In addition, STCs also facilitate the development of 
coalitions so that Members can work cooperatively to push for adjustment, 
or to coordinate their approach if the concern develops into a dispute.24 
Clear guidelines for the submission of STCs to the committee should 
be established, based on existing practices in the TBT and SPS committees. 
Mainly, it is important that Members submit STCs in advance of regular 
committee meetings so that they may be placed on the meeting agenda and 
circulated at least ten days in advance of committee meetings. This provides 
the Member maintaining the measure an opportunity to prepare a response 
and to organize a private bilateral meeting with the Member concerned to 
speak frankly about the measure.25 Advance notice also cools the 
temperature of discussions and facilitates technical discussion of matters, 
limiting political posturing. 
 
 23.  Holzer, supra note 10, at 3; Marianna B. Karttunen, Transparency and Dispute Settlements: 
Complements or Substitutes? A Study of the Agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and 
Technical Barriers to Trade 223 (Dec. 12, 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, European University Institute) 
(on file with Department of Law, European University Institute). 
 24.  See Manak, supra note 11, at 6–7 (discussing how STCs can, inter alia, facilitate coalition 
building and increased cooperation amongst states). 
 25.  These bilaterals generally take place on the sidelines of scheduled committee meetings. 
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B. Open Discussion and Closed Technical Group 
In addition to the specific work of the committee detailed above, there 
is also great benefit in maintaining a forum for the general discussion of 
national security matters and trade. Any items related to systemic issues 
should be placed on the committee agenda in advance of meetings. Where 
discussion would benefit from more extensive treatment, special sessions on 
thematic issues should be undertaken within the same week that committee 
meetings are held. For example, there could be a session on the expansion of 
foreign investment screening for national security reasons. This will allow 
for a more detailed and focused discussion and coordination on these specific 
topics. Looking at the GATS committees, Andrew Lang and Joanne Scott 
have noted how sustained discussions in these committees can “help to build 
common conceptual frameworks and shared ideas about the fundamental 
objectives and limits of the GATS.”26 This is what WTO Secretariat official 
Erik Wijkström describes as building blocks that can help develop best 
practices among Members and serve as the basis for more cooperative efforts 
to address common challenges. 
While this function is prominent in a number of other committees and 
would be useful in this case, it does have its limitations. A particular 
difficulty in this context is the nature of the measures themselves. Since 
measures are being taken for the stated purpose of national security, there 
will inevitably be some topics that Members would not want to openly 
discuss and have documented in the minutes of the committee meetings. 
Therefore, we suggest that a Technical Group also be established to serve as 
a forum for off-the-record discussions of sensitive issues, where Members 
can engage in a more direct manner. The Technical Group could be 
composed of committee delegates and would ideally include officials from 
capital, not just delegates from the missions in Geneva, with specific 
expertise on the matter at issue (i.e. experts from government agencies). This 
would not only keep the discussions technical, but also provide for 
opportunities to develop recommendations for the committee, for example, 
on information that should be provided or excluded from specific 
notifications. Essentially, where open discussion is not practical, Members 
should be afforded other options. 
This would also act as a temporary escape valve for discussion on a 
specific measure that a Member has taken, or is planning to take, which could 
not be resolved in the regular meetings of the committee. In effect, the 
Technical Group would be the second stage in discussions of a matter before 
 
 26.  Andrew Lang & Joanne Scott, The Hidden World of WTO Governance, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 575, 
587 (2009). 
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ad hoc consultations and the rebalancing process are pursued. It thus 
provides an additional buffer for Members before action against the Member 
maintaining the measure can be taken, thus serving to prevent the escalation 
of actions into trade conflict. 
C. Ad Hoc Consultations and the Rebalancing Process 
The functions detailed above are important for giving Members an 
opportunity and an incentive to explain their national security measures 
before other Members take trade actions in response, offering more time 
before rebalancing can be applied where measures have been notified. In the 
absence of litigation and when the discussions of notified measures do not 
generate a resolution in committee (either in regular session or through the 
Technical Group), a process of ad hoc consultations for rebalancing should 
be made available. Regarding how this rebalancing process would work, 
there is something to learn from the existing safeguards process. On paper at 
least, the Safeguards Agreement rules provide for a quick rebalancing, either 
through compensation or suspension. Under Articles 8.1 and 12.3, when a 
Member proposes to apply or extend a safeguard measure, it “shall 
endeavour to maintain a substantially equivalent level of concessions and 
other obligations” with those Members “affected by such a measure.” To 
achieve this, the Members concerned “may agree on any adequate means of 
trade compensation.” If compensation cannot be agreed to, Articles 8.2 and 
8.3 govern suspensions of concessions or other obligations by the affected 
Members, which can be imposed under certain conditions. Under Article 
13.1(e), the Safeguards Committee is to “review, at the request of the 
Member taking a safeguard measure, whether proposals to suspend 
concessions or other obligations are ‘substantially equivalent,’ and report as 
appropriate to the Council for Trade in Goods.” 
In practice, however, this system has not worked very well. 
Compensation is a challenge, in part because of the most-favored nation 
(MFN) requirement, which places practical limits on what the imposing 
Member can offer. And suspension is not allowed for three years unless 
specific conditions are met, which allows Members to impose their safeguard 
measures for a term of three years and avoid retaliation. To date, the rules 
and Committee functions have not been able to facilitate the safeguards 
rebalancing process. Issues surrounding this process are currently being 
litigated in the Turkey—Air Conditioners case, DS573.27 
 
 27.  See Request for Consultations by Thailand, Turkey—Additional Duties on Imports of Air 
Conditioning Machines from Thailand, WTO Doc. WT/DS573/1 (Dec. 10, 2018). The Panel has reported 
that it “does not expect to issue its final report to the parties before the second half of 2020.” 
Communication from the Panel, Turkey—Additional Duties on Imports of Air Conditioning Machines, 
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For national security rebalancing to work, it needs to account for the 
problems with the safeguards rebalancing process. With regard to 
compensation, one improvement in the national security context would be 
that the Committee could look across all sectors, as it is not limited to goods. 
Thus, if offering additional market access to other goods is too sensitive, as 
the least sensitive tariffs have already been lowered, a government might 
consider offering up liberalization of services, where only a small amount of 
liberalization has occurred so far. Governments might find that there are a 
number of areas where services liberalization would help them as well as 
their trading partners. 
For both compensation and suspension, what is needed is a mechanism 
to evaluate competing claims of economic injury, as the two sides are not 
likely to agree on the amount of harm. Full-fledged dispute settlement would 
be too contentious and time-consuming, but some kind of third-party 
intervention may be useful. This is something the safeguards process has 
lacked. 
The ad hoc consultation process should allow for the following: 
• an opportunity for affected parties to express concern about a trade 
restriction and indicate the amount of economic harm; 
• an opportunity for the opposing party to counter with its own harm 
estimates and offers of compensation; 
• an expedited mediation/arbitration process when the parties cannot 
reach agreement on compensation, in order to determine the amount 
of harm (the process could be overseen by the chair of the committee 
or some other appointee agreed to by the parties);28 and 
• a deadline for the imposing party to offer compensation, after which 
retaliation in the designated amount, as determined by consultations, 
is authorized. 
The committee, perhaps through a special working group, can track and 
monitor the outcome of these ad hoc consultations, gathering data, 
evaluating the effectiveness, and proposing modifications. Working groups 
established for this purpose should be temporary, and only include parties to 
the original ad hoc consultation, unless both parties agree otherwise. To 
 
WTO Doc.  WT/DS573/14 (Oct. 9, 2019). 
 28.  This mediation/arbitration procedure is not envisioned as a replication of a procedure that was 
established by the SPS committee in 2014, which provided the chair of the committee to act as a third-
party mediator between members on matters of concern, when requested. For the 2014 procedure, see 
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Procedures to Encourage and Facilitate the 
Resolution of Specific Sanitary or Phytosanitary Issues Among Members in Accordance with Article 12.2, 
WTO Doc. G/SPS/61 (Sept. 8, 2014). Instead, Members should establish a procedure for choosing from 
a roster of potential third-party mediators or arbitrators, which do not have to be WTO delegates or staff. 
For example, former Appellate Body judges could be used. 
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ensure some transparency, Members should be obligated to notify when 
compensation has been agreed to, or retaliation will be taken to the 
committee. The details of compensation should be disclosed, although 
Members could decline to do so. Retaliation would have to be made public, 
however. 
Compensation is the preferred approach to rebalancing. Ideally, 
governments that impose tariffs or other restrictions on specific products for 
national security purposes would offer to reduce tariffs or restrictions on 
other products or services (although if a government is acting in a 
protectionist manner, expecting it to liberalize is perhaps unrealistic). 
Adding services as a compensation option may be significant. One of the 
reasons compensation has not worked as well in recent years in the 
safeguards context is that as tariff levels have decreased, it has become 
harder for countries invoking safeguards to find alternative products on 
which they could give meaningful concessions.29 Adding services to the mix 
would open a wide range of compensation possibilities, especially 
considering how few services commitments most countries have made and 
thus how much potential there is for additional liberalization. 
Negotiations over the extent of this compensation will never be easy, 
but they can be facilitated through carefully-designed rules. For example, 
there could be a requirement that in order to impose an import restriction for 
national security reasons, a government must identify three products or 
services for which it would consider negotiating compensatory 
liberalization. Forcing governments to suggest possible compensation could 
give the negotiating process a boost. 
That process will come with some significant challenges. It will bump 
up against core GATT/WTO principles such as MFN. Liberalizing trade with 
only the complainant undermines this principle, while liberalizing trade with 
everyone makes the exercise much more challenging.30 
 
 29.  JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 168 (1994); Chad P. Bown & Meredith A. 
Crowley, Safeguards in the World Trade Organization 6 (Feb. 2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with Brandeis University), http://people.brandeis.edu/~cbown/papers/bown_crowley_kluwer.pdf 
(“Although compensation for safeguard measures was often negotiated in the 1960s and 1970s, as tariff 
rates fell and more products came to be freely traded, as a practical matter, it became difficult for countries 
to agree on compensation packages.”). See also Matthew R. Nicely & David T. Hardin, Article 8 of the 
WTO Safeguards Agreement: Reforming the Right to Rebalance, 23 J. CIV. RTS. ECON. DEV. 699, 716 
(2008) (discussing the impact of tariffs on concessions). 
 30.  Direct payments to the affected foreign producers, like in the U.S.–Cotton Subsidies case may 
offer a solution, but they are not always a political possibility, and they are far from ideal as a matter of 
policy. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
As governments continue to push forward with bilateral, regional, and 
multilateral trade agreements, there will be opportunities to experiment with 
new mechanisms. The Trump administration is unlikely to support the 
proposals made here (and some other countries are likely to object as well), 
but other governments that are concerned about the abuse of national security 
measures can incorporate provisions along these lines in agreements that 
they sign, both bilateral and plurilateral. In this way, the norm can spread, 
with the hope that its usefulness will be demonstrated and with the aim of 
eventual inclusion in a multilateral agreement. 
 
